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COMMENT
COMMENTARY TO ANDREAS FISCHER-
LESCANO & GUNTHER TEUBNER
THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
INTRODUCTION: FRAGMENTATION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE
It will come as a surprise to many readers that Professor Teubner pre-
sented their fascinating contribution on regime collision' to the Michigan
Journal of International Law's Symposium on a panel devoted to "the Role
of the State in International Law." Indeed, one could not imagine better
devil's advocates than Professor Teubner and Dr. Andreas Fischer-Lescano.
They propose a radical break with a concept of international law and order
based on the autonomous will of Nation-States. Accordingly, legal regulation
does not only, if at all, emanate from Nation-States, but from a panoply of
other public and, mostly, private actors. Thus, the authors dismiss all claims
of an "organizational or dogmatic unity of international law.
' 2
Professor Teubner and Dr. Fischer-Lescano do, however, not only chal-
lenge the "Westphalian system, 3 but also the recent advocacy of the Bush
administration in favor of a world of sovereign Nation-States loosely coop-
erating in "coalitions of the willing." The experience with recent
international rulings may confirm their viewpoint. For example, the Bush
administration was forced to apply the WTO Appellate Body decision de-
claring U.S. steel tariffs illegal.'
However, such an explanation fails to recognize the element of choice. It
was the United States that imposed the tariffs in the first place, in full
knowledge of their doubtful compatibility with trade rules. It also considera-
bly underestimates the possibility of irrational behavior in spite of the perfect
knowledge of the threat of negative consequences. In any case, it was the
1. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collision: The Vain Search for
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999 (2004).
2. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, at 1017.
3. See, e.g., Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia: 1648-1948,42 AM. J, INT'L L. 20 (1948).
4. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks as delivered at the Marshall Center
10th Anniversary in Garmisch, Germany (June 11, 2003) at http://www.defenselink.mil/
speeches/2003/sp2003061 t-secdef0285.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2003).
5. See United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, Nov. 10, 2003, WTO Doe. WT/DS248/AB/R, WTO Doc.
WT/DS249/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS251/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS252/AB/R, WTO Doe.
WT/DS253/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS254/AB/R, WTO Doc. WT/DS258/AB/R, WTO Doc.
WT/DS259/AB/R, all available at http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-
status_e.htm#2003.
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State which decided not only to accept the obligations in question, but also
whether to implement the international decision or rather suffer the conse-
6
quences.
Nevertheless, the characterization of the present predicament as one of
fragmentation of the public space into different issue areas conforms to the
experience of most international lawyers. The unity of the Nation-State ap-
pears increasingly illusory. Legal specialization does not stop at national
borders. Although States are represented in the vast majority of decision-
making bodies, whether at the WTO or in the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision,' it may be more important whether a State representative re-
gards herself as trade lawyer, environmental lawyer, or human rights lawyer,
than whether she represents the United Kingdom or Morocco. Thus, for
many lawyers, globalization appears indeed characterized by a shift from
territorial borders to functional boundaries.8 Most issue areas9 such as trade,
environment, or human rights have left territorial boundaries behind and
cannot be dealt with effectively at a national level.
But States continue to be the main unit of legitimacy and of, ideally de-
mocratic, debate and decision-making. For this role of the State, no
substitute appears on the horizon. The "democratic deficit" of regional and
international institutions remains unresolved; alternative models of legiti-
macy-such as pure functionalism and market rationality-are based on a
standard of efficiency which is itself in need of justification. Systems of
rules and norms constructed 'bottom-up,' that is, by a process of self-
6. This does not imply that such action would be compatible with WTO rules. See Judith
Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416,
416-17 (1996). For a convincing argument against Hippler Bello, see John H. Jackson, The WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 60 (1997); John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Re-
ports: Obligation to Comply or Option to 'Buy Out'?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (2004). Bello has
modified her view since. See Judith Hippler Bello, Book Review, 95 AM J. INT'L L. 984, 986-87
(2001) (reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OFGAT & THE WTO (2000)); but see
Warren F Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure ofRenegotiation andDispute Reso-
lution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUDS. S 179, S 190 (2002) (endorsing Bello's
earlier viewpoint).
7. On government networks generally, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD OR-
DER (2004); for criticism regarding the lack of democratic accountability of these networks, see
Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 435 (1997).
8. NIKLAs LUHMANN, DAs RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFr 571 (1995); NiKLAs LUHMANN, DIE
GESELLSCHAFT DER GESELLSCHAFr 158-60 (1997).
9. For the term, see, e.g., David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 6-10 (2002).
To compare the term "regimes" as used by political scientists, see Stephen D. Krasner, Structural
Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). However, as Leebron shows, supra at 9, the latter definitions
lie square to legal terminology.
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ordering of a particular issue area,'0 cannot legitimize outcomes, because
they are self-imposed by the relevant power holders and power brokers-and
thus open to challenges from all those not participating in the process, but
subject to their decisions.
As Daniel Philpott's contribution to this symposium" has demonstrated
anew, the stakes of this debate can hardly be overstated. The religious wars
caused the Western nations to recognize the monopoly of legitimate violence
in the State. After the horrific World Wars and Nazi crimes, international
society extended, to a certain degree, this solution to the international level
by requiring Security Council approval for the use of force by States except
in self-defense. 2 Thus, no less is in question than the idea of the Nation-
State as authoritative, but democratic arbiter of disputes between citizens,
and as a locus of democratic struggle, debate and decision-making about the
"public interest."
Of course, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano do not ignore the problem.
They argue that each sub-system can itself develop the relevant decision-
making processes in a transparent and democratic fashion. But this proposi-
tion pre-supposes an analysis of who is affected by the decisions within an
issue area. Due to the uncertainty and fallibility of all consequential analysis,
however, the effects of decisions in one subsystem on others will also be in-
determinate and uncertain. Therefore, the presumption underlying the
general competence of States-namely, that most decisions in the public
sphere affect all citizens and must therefore be legitimized, directly or indi-
rectly, by all of them-is also valid internationally, whether one deals with
human rights, the environment, or trade and development.
Thus, the present contribution suggests that the appeal of Teubner's and
Fischer-Lecano's model is diminished by a certain lack of attention to ques-
tions of democratic legitimacy. This argument reproduces, to a certain
extent, the famous Methodenstreit between Niklas Luhmann and Jirgen
Habermas at the international level. 3 Nevertheless, the phenomena described
by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano are real, and reaffirmations of orthodoxy
will be of little help. The following comments suggest that, in spite of an
10. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
11. Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 981 (2004).
12. Of course, recent developments may have unraveled this compact. See Michael J. Glen-
non, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN Ari. 16 (May/June 2003). For arguments against
Glennon's views, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Review Essay: Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 446, 447-48 (2003); Andreas L. Paulus, The War against Iraq and the Future of Interna-
tional Law: Hegemony or Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691,716-17 (2004) (containing further
references).
13. See JORGEN HABERMAS & NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAF-r ODER
SOZIALTECHNOLOGIE: WAS LEISTET DIE SYSTEMFORSCHUNG? (1971).
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ever-growing functional differentiation, issue areas are held together by a
minimum of common values and decision-making procedures" 4 --in other
words, by general international law which bases its legitimacy on decisions
of, ideally democratic, national processes of decision-making.
LEGITIMACY PROBLEMS IN A WORLD OF MULTIPLE REGIMES
A. Pluralism as a Value-The Example of Religion
In a certain way, the approach suggested by Professor Teubner and Dr.
Fischer-Lescano itself requires the recognition of some first principles com-
mon to all legal systems, from the application of legal method to the
recognition of a pluralism both of values and issue areas. However, not all
systems lend themselves easily to such recognition of their inherent limits.
The most telling example is religion, and, as Professor Philpott has shown in
his presentation, it was religion which brought about the necessity for a plu-
ralist international system based on territory and the principle of cuius regio,
eius religio.5 The terrorism promulgated by a certain branch of Islamic fun-
damentalism has recently shown that the universal recognition of religious
pluralism remains precarious even in the contemporary inter-State order.
That may also be a reason why human rights and religion occasionally
have an uneasy relationship.16 For some, human rights consist of almost neu-
tral, substantively empty principles protecting individuals against
interference from the public. In that vein, human rights delineate the public
and private spaces and do not express overarching values. Increasingly, how-
ever, human rights seem to fulfill, in the international system, a quasi-
religious, ideological function, providing values for the international system
and defining limits for legal regulation-a function, of course, which is em-
braced and not contradicted by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano.' 7 But if each
and every subsystem must observe the values of human rights, equal partici-
pation, and even democratic governance, there is not only fragmentation, but
also a considerable amount of "value-glue"-and therefore unity. That is
exactly what international ius cogens is about-and the skepticism expressed
by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano18 contrasts with their optimism regarding
the emergence of similar processes within specific issue areas.' 9 But to the
14. For a practical example, see Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: Inter-
national Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903 (2004).
15. Philpott, supra note 11.
16. Cf. Philpott, supra note 11.
17. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, 1033 passim.
18. Id.
19. Of course, this does not imply that ius cogens in its current form can fulfill this function
properly.
1050 [Vol. 25:1047
Comment to Fischer-Lescano & Teubner
extent human rights are providing those values, they will occasionally con-
flict with other overarching systems, for example religion.
Of course, this comment does not suggest that religious freedom and
pluralism are necessarily incompatible with each other. The challenge rather
consists in devising a legal order that allows for the expression of different
religions, albeit each of them claims to present a comprehensive system-in
other words, in devising a legal order representing a Rawlsian "overlapping
consensus."20 But religious fundamentalism demonstrates that functional plu-
ralism is itself grounded on values. It thus cannot avoid questions of
legitimacy by pointing to a miraculous "auto-poiesis" of subsystems that
would automatically justify their separate existence. Teubner's and Fischer-
Lescano's pluralism must itself rely on the recognition of overarching values
by the participants of the system. In other words, for the avoidance of an all-
out war between fragments claiming comprehensiveness and sovereignty,
some unitarian principles for the relationship between different subsystems
and issue areas are required. Thus, the discussion cannot be avoided about
what establishes such a consensus-and whose consensus it is anyway.
B. International Law as Overarching System
This question thus leads us to the role of (international) law in the man-
agement of the systems and of their intercourse. One possibility to
conceptualize the role of law-which seems to be espoused by Teubner and
Fischer-Lescano-is to regard law as a meta-phenomenon, as following the
development of the issue areas it applies to. Changes in the structure of other
systems (such as politics or religion) will be reflected in the law applying to
them.21 On the other hand, however, law itself is a system of its own, con-
taining its own set of assumptions how to generate knowledge and to arrive
at normative conclusions. The inherent characteristics and specificities of
law provide for a minimum of unity and coherence, such as rules on law-
making, law interpretation, and law enforcement.
As to international law, many observers have doubted its legal character,
from John Austin 22 to contemporaries like now Under-Secretary of State
20. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133 passim (1993). For an extension of the over-
lapping consensus to the international realm, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 14 (1995); ANDREAS L. PAULUS, DIE INTERNATIONALE
GEMEINSCHAFT IM VOLKERRECHT: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES VOLKERRECHTS
IM ZEITALTER DER GLOBALISIERUNG 157-59 (2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONALE GEMEIN-
SCHAFF]; THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 227 (1989); BRAD ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL
ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1999).
21. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1.
22. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 117-26 (Wilfried E.
Rumble ed., 1995).
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John Bolton.23 As H.L.A. Hart has put it, international law allegedly misses
"secondary" rules of recognition, change and adjudication.14 Some, such as
Thomas Franck, have recently concluded that international law has now ac-
quired these qualities, only to have second thoughts on matters such as
'6Kosovo and Iraq. Niklas Luhmann was decidedly more optimistic. Noting
the gap between societal development and its translation into legal form, the
lawyer-turned-sociologist remarked with his characteristic irony: "But natu-
rally, even lawyers have the courage to travel and to thereby step beyond the
area of validity of their legal order.' 27 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano now
seem to recognize a lot of law in separate functional issue areas, but not in
the overarching system. In fact, their claim that law has to follow functional
issue areas seems to care little about the specific characteristics and assump-
tions of a legal as opposed to a political or social order.
However, if (international) law is supposed to be a system of its own, it
needs to have basic systemic rules in place. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano
appear to believe that these rules are different from system to system, but
they tell us little of how they come about. In fact, in almost all cases cited by
them, whether the Yahoo! case, copyright or patent law, the legal regulations
in question stem from the very State or inter-State bodies which have been
dismissed before as increasingly irrelevant. Thus, a trend from territorial to
functional tasks will be followed by functional rather than territorial con-
flicts of norms-but this also depends on the norms in question, not only on
the problem to solve. It makes a difference whether one balances interna-
tional labor law against trade law or national copyright laws against different
national standards for the limitation of freedom of speech.
The parsimonious character of international law makes it quite malleable
for the self-ordering of regimes-within certain limits. International law
grounds its obligations either in consent or in custom-and recognizes cer-
tain general principles, either internationally or derived from domestic legal
systems.8 One may dispute whether such an order fulfills Hart's require-ments for a legal system, 29 but it certainly provides enough leeway for leges
23. John Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1 (2000). For a spirited defense of the legal character of international law, see
Anthony d'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 N.W. U. L. REV. 25 (1985).
24. HERBERT L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994).
25. See FRANCK, supra note 20, at 1-6.
26. For recent discussion, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002); Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The
United Nations After Iraq, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003).
27. LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAF', supra note 8, at 573 n. 40 (my translation).
The German original reads: "Aber naturlich haben auch Juristen den Mut zu reisen und dabei den
Geltungsbereich ihrer Rechtsordnung zu oiberschreiten."
28. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 56 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993.
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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speciales. The main problem does not lie in the international legal require-
ments for binding norms, but in the limitation of its law-making subjects to
States. However, this problem is not impossible to overcome if one contem-
plates applying the same criteria-namely, the legally binding nature of
formal commitments and of custom accompanied by a joint conviction re-
garding their legally binding nature-to the pronouncements of non-State
actors."' However, non-State actors can only bind themselves. As soon as
public interests are at stake, only public decision-making appears legitimate.
Thus, the question of "who decides?" appears everything but "unimpor-
tant."3
Teubner and Fischer-Lescano suggest substituting ius cogens by a re-
gime-specific transnational ordre public. They are skeptical, although not
quite hostile, towards recent claims of the "constitutionalization" of an "in-
ternational community law."32 The present author shares their skepticism if
such constitutionalization attempts to artificially construct hierarchical legal
orders independent of the actual international consensus.33 But as far as ius
cogens is concerned, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano are working with the
same concepts as international lawyers do, in particular human rights and
participation. 4 Different issue-related legal subsystems are far more likely to
refer to general human rights-requirements than to create new ones-the
transnational ordre public will thus appear as little more than an implemen-
tation of existing ius cogens. But even if such specific ordre public rules can
be shown to exist, they do not take away the need for some common mini-
mum standards for any legal subsystem. Some of these rules will be more of
a formal nature-how rules are made and interpreted-others will be sub-
stantive, setting material limits to the self-ordering of subsystems.
Ultimately, of course, it is a matter of perspective whether one interprets
the use of norms from other systems as an autonomous incorporation or as
evidence for the existence of one common system.35 Thus, one may under-
stand Teubner's and Fischer-Lescano's presentation not so much as advocacy
of fragmented systems without a minimum of common legal rules, but as an
argument for a greater equilibrium between hierarchical and diverse views of
international law-an argument which finds the enthusiastic support of the
30. For a discussion of the human rights obligations of corporations, see Steven R. Ratner,
Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
31. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional
Theory? in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 16 (Christian Joerges et al.
eds., 2004).
32. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, 1014, 1033.
33. Cf PAULUS, INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAF', supra note 20, at 285-318.
34. See, e.g., Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 1.
35. Cf Andreas L. Paulus, Beyond the Monism-Dualism Debate, Paper presented at the
Seminars on Theoretical Approaches to the Relationship Between International and National Law
(Amsterdam, Jan. 17, 2003). I also thank Dirk Pulkowski for directing my attention to this point.
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present author. On the other hand, however, the increasing recognition of the
same body of non-derogable norms beyond the fall-back rules of interna-
tional law demonstrates the 'staying power' of an international ius cogens
over and above the ordinary norms of specific legal orders.
C. Collision-Norms and Democratic Legitimacy
The main problem with the theory of the autopoietic character of the law
of new legal regimes most likely relates to its lack of attention for questions
of legitimacy. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano create the impression that the
stakeholders in each system can perfectly take care of questions of legiti-
macy themselves. Accordingly, legitimacy itself is a relative concept and
must therefore be dealt with separately in each system. At times, Teubner
and Fischer-Lescano seem to rely on a sort of materialist theory, according
to which the solution follows quasi-automatically from the inherent charac-
teristics of the functionalities involved. But such a claim hides rather than
uncovers the basically political character of the decision: Balancing trade
and animal protection may not always be possible, for example, by uphold-
ing both. Imagine you could catch tuna only by killing dolphins. In this case,
compromise is impossible; either tuna or dolphin. Preferring the one to the
other, however, requires a political choice. Such legitimacy can only come
from a process which is considered legitimate by the international commu-
nity at large. Criteria for legitimate decisions are of a general, not of a
functional nature. Besides, by emphasizing the separate character of func-
tional systems, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano seem to ignore that, in a
globalized world, everything is somehow connected to everything else. As
anyone who has watched TV reports on natural or political crisis can attest,
global communication leads to some global responsibility. Thus, the separate
character of each legal subsystem appears limited. To give an example: In
the Yahoo! case, a French court decided that Yahoo! had to block a racist
webpage as far as it can be seen in France because its display there violates
sect. R.645-2 of the French Criminal Code.36
Should we allow such questions to be decided by the "Web community,"
for instance ICANN, because a regulation by a territorial State alone is not
fully possible and the Internet should be regulated internationally rather than
nationally? Or should we allow the French courts to order Yahoo! to at least
take those steps to block territorial access that appear technically feasible
(which would block access in France to about 90 percent)? The result of the
first solution would be a unified regulation probably in the interest of most
Internet providers and most customers (but certainly not all, in particular
those who favor continental European rather than Anglo-Saxon free speech
36. On the case see Mathias Reimann, Introduction: The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws
in the Cyberage, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 663-65 (2003) (containing further references).
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standards). In the second case, 100 percent efficiency cannot be reached (if
one does not allow for a complete shutdown of the Internet in France which
no reasonable person would contemplate), but the majority of the French
society which legitimizes the outlawing of neo-Nazi propaganda would win
over the interests of the global Internet community.
However, the solution on the basis of Internet self-ordering appears ille-
gitimate. The eighty-year-old Holocaust victim is affected (and offended) by
neo-Nazi propaganda on right-wing-websites even if she does not use the
Internet, but learns of the contents of the sites in her local newspaper. She is
not represented, however, when the Internet community is allowed to regu-
late itself. Likewise, everybody, not only the potential Internet users, will be
affected by the success of strategies to improve access to the Internet. This
would require, in turn, that legitimate decisions need to include representa-
tives of society of a whole.
Teubner and Fischer-Lescano tread on thin ice to only take care of the
concerns of the insiders of the system, not of the outsiders. Because deci-
sions made within many systems profoundly influence the fate of those not
within the system, some general system of accountability and legitimacy
seems preferable to functionally fragmented ones. At the very least, func-
tional systems should be built by processes of a general nature-such as
public international law treaties-and not by custom-designed, but not nec-
essarily legitimate special procedures. In other words, the move from
territoriality to functionality should not be accompanied by a move from
democracy to technocracy. This ultimately requires a minimum of public
control over the private exercise of power.
D. Fragmentation and the Role of the Lawyer
Finally, the system advocated by Teubner and Fischer-Lescano also
raises questions with regard to the role of the lawyer. They counsel the law-
yer to go beyond colliding state-set norms and thus to use their authority to
devise new, functionally attuned rules.37 However, this transforms the lawyer
from a representative of society to an active rule-maker. It is of course un-
avoidable that lawyers devise rules in the absence of authoritative
pronouncements by legislatures, in particular in cases of collision of differ-
ent sets of rules and principles. However, this does not take away the duty of
the lawyer to refer her authority back to the society which has empowered
her under the condition of respect for the law as set by the competent politi-
cal authorities. In the United States, we see currently a backlash against
judges who openly assume "political" roles at the detriment of the
legislature. As much as one may deplore the slow process of international
37. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 1, at 1017, 1024.
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rule-making by State consensus, there is no doubt that the lawyer is simply
not entitled to ignore the existing norms emanating from democratically
elected national legislatures.
In the end, the lawyer represents not functional systems, but human be-
ings, human beings who are not-or at least should not be-the objects, but
the subjects of the system. Although the human being belongs to several
functional associations, she is a whole, not a functionally disaggregated en-
tity. As such, she needs not only functional systems that serve her specific
needs, but also a comprehensive representation which is able to weigh dif-
ferent interests against each other. Thus, States as representatives of the
public appear not at all redundant. The disaggregated character of power in
the European legal orders may sometimes appear to dissimulate the repre-
sentative character of the democratic Nation-State, but the discussion of the
democratic deficit of European institutions brings the point home. In the
United States, there may be more space for self-regulation, but only public
authorities are deemed to be entitled to authoritative law-making. The lawyer
is bound to implement the presumed will of her constituents.
CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
LASTING ROLE OF STATES
There is little doubt in the present author's mind that Teubner and
Fischer-Lescano have identified the challenges for international law in the
twenty-first century. Indeed, "uncritically transferring nation-state circum-
stances to world society" will not help at a time when new international
actors make the old border between States and international society disap-
pear in order to create a profoundly pluralist international community.
Neither, as Professor Teubner has pointed out elsewhere,38 will unlearning
the constitutional experience do. No doubt, networking will play a central
part in any solution to be found. Nevertheless, questions of democratic le-
gitimacy and of a common value-base remain part of the agenda. The
reliance on hierarchies, such as ius cogens or a constitutional reading of the
Charter of the United Nations will not be sufficient and does not provide
solutions in each and every value conflict. If no legal norm is in place, and
no legal principle available, the lawyer cannot simply run away from her job
but must find a solution by balancing both the norms and interests involved.
Where I depart company with Teubner and Fischer-Lescano is their reli-
ance on and trust in apolitical, functionalist solutions to value-conflicts
between different legal orders, and their apparent disregard for questions of
political legitimacy. In a world in which international and regional organiza-
38. Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism, supra note 31.
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tions suffer from the (in)famous "democratic deficit," democratic account-
ability and responsibility is still concentrated in States. Thus, States remain
the main source of legitimacy for political decisions. That is why interna-
tional law still relies on State consent and inter-State consensus. States also
play a central role in the protection of human rights, in spite of increasing
international supervision.
Law in general, and international law in particular, does not only follow
slavishly the needs of other systems such as religion or cyberspace, but is
based on normative assumptions and values of its own. It is a system of its
own and thus maintains a basic unity. The rules on law-making by State con-
sensus provide, for the time being, for a certain formal unity of international
law. Some of the products of this process, in particular the Charter of the
United Nations and the ius cogens norms of human rights, peace, interna-
tional criminal justice, and free trade, provide a substantive cohesion of an
otherwise loose system permitting for a lot of derogation from its frame-
work.3 9 As long as there is no world State in place, the analysis of the
breakdown of the State appears overstated-there is no international mecha-
nism, neither globally, nor sectorally, which could substitute the legitimizing
role of the State (system).
Let us make no mistake: Globalization is bringing about important
changes in world governance, with an increasing importance of non-State
actors and more independent international organizations, but also with an
increasing insistence of world civil society on accountability and democracy
of both international and domestic actors. But it appears to be no winning
strategy, I would submit, to advocate changes which would bring about less
accountability and democracy by taking away the instances of representation
of the overall public. As such an institution, the State remains indispensable
not only for regulating parochial local affairs, but also for striving to realize
something akin to the common good, both domestically and, jointly with
others, internationally.
When reading Teubner's and Fischer-Lescano's article more closely, the
critical reader discovers many common threads in the different issue areas,
such as the importance of human rights and of democratic and transparent
decision-making procedures, as well as the recognition of the relativity of
functional borders and hence of the necessity of accommodation. Thus, a
case can be made for an international order based on the rule of law which
does recognize, even celebrate, functional fragmentation, but does not lose
sight of the necessity of a substantive coherence of laws and institutions
39. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L'unitj de l'ordre juridique international. Cours gingral de
droit international public, 297 RECUEIL DES COURS 9,93,207,passim (2002). For a development of
common values in contemporary international law, see PAULUS, INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT,
supra note 20, at 250-70.
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translating requirements of legitimacy into comprehensive legal norms and
principles binding on all.
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